Joseph LeDoux is a celebrated neuroscientist whose latest book is a work of quite staggering ambition - it traces the ‘Four Billion Year Story of How We Got Conscious Brains’. He reveals the profound similarities between us and bacteria, as well as offering a brilliant, overarching account of what makes us unique in the animal kingdom; how we developed the capacity for emotion and self-consciousness.   2:27 LeDoux describes his career path – from a small town in Louisiana, via business administration to the legendary studies on split-brain patients he undertook with Michael Gazzaniga.    9:11 What are ‘split brain’ patients and why are they so intriguing? LeDoux describes one of the pioneering experiments he was involved with in the 70s and what they reveal. The split brain experiments may be tricky to understand from the audio alone! Here’s the experimental set up and results we’re describing... RIGHT hemisphere sees: SNOW SCENE LEFT hemisphere sees: a CHICKEN  *Then* participant then asked: pick the object associated with the image. Right hand (controlled by LEFT hemisphere) picks a CHICKEN CLAW Left hand (controlled by RIGHT hemisphere) picks a SNOW SHOVEL BUT the left hemisphere offers a surprising explanation for the behaviour of the left hand… 12:48 Why do we need a ‘deep’ history that covers 4 billion years of evolution? LeDoux explains how his research kept drawing him deeper and deeper into evolutionary history as he traced the origins of the molecular mechanisms at work in our own brains.    22.16 We discuss the staggering fact that even bacteria have a basic capacity for learning and memory 24:16 What do we have in common with the mother of all organisms - LUCA - (the Last Universal Common Ancestor). LeDoux argues that a lot of behaviour is driven by impulses related to survival, rather than the mental states (the thoughts and feelings) which accompany behaviour. Consciousness 26:10 Do we feel emotion because of action, or do we act because of emotion? LeDoux takes issue with William James. 29:00 Darwin was not such a great psychologist. LeDoux cautions against the tempting assumption that animals are conscious, while admitting tends to assume his cat is conscious. 32:26 “Behaviour is not a tool of the mind, it’s a tool of survival.” This falls out of a deep history of the mind. 36:25 To what extent we are still at the mercy of ancient instincts and impulses – how much more control does cognition afford us? What kind of consciousness might other animals have? LeDoux describes ‘autonoetic consciousness’, the ability for the self to be part of an experience, as distinctively human. He traces the evidence for different forms of consciousness in other animals and discusses brai based differences.  39:56 LeDoux sets out the Higher Order theory of consciousness which he defends. Is it really just a search for the neural correlates of consciousness, or an explanation for phenomenal consciousness?   42:36 “Once we understand consciousness, we get emotions for free” 44:30 What elements are required to have an emotion? LeDoux explains why he got a T-shirt printed with “No self, no fear”.  46:43 Are our conscious minds in the driving seat, or are they just monitoring the auto-pilot? LeDoux admits he’s ‘kinda waffley’ on free will (49:23) so I let it go…  49:41 What brain features are associated with having a developed self-schema, which other primates don’t? 54.14 LeDoux surprises me with the suggestion that maybe emotion did not arise through natural selection! 58:21 We discuss the book’s epilogue, starting with LeDoux’s evocative statement, “While autonoetic self-awareness is the enabler of our deepest problems, it is also our sole hope for a future.” The deep history tells us that species come and go. Bacteria will definitely make it through environmental catastrophe, but will we?  IN CONSCIOUSNESS WE MUST TRUST The Deep History of Ourselves: The Four-Billion-Year Story of How We Got Conscious Brains Follow NOUS on Twitter @NSthepodcast Email at nousthepodcast@gmail.com    

NOUS

Joseph LeDoux on the 4 Billion Year Journey to Our Conscious Selves

Vision is the best understood sensory domain. But smell is turning out to be wonderfully strange and even more complex than sight. Dr Ann-Sophie Barwich joins me to explore ideas from her recent book Smellosophy. How is vomit related to parmesan cheese? Why do things smell so different depending on context? And what does smell teach us about the very nature of perception?  We explore: Why the ‘promiscuity’ of smell doesn’t make it merely subjective. Smells can have a multitude of qualities or notes depending on the context and depending on the individual. But this variability has a functional basis.  The weird neural representation of smell. The patterns of neural activation underpinning smell don’t follow the mapping principles followed by other sensory modalities.  Why philosophers shouldn’t ignore the neural ‘plumbing’ of sensory systems. Evolved brain mechanisms underly the nature and function of the perceptual experience  - so they have to inform a philosophical account of perception.   Check out Dr Barwich’s book Smellosophy here, https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674983694,  her article in Aeon magazine here https://aeon.co/essays/why-might-it-be-easier-to-fool-your-eyes-than-your-nose. and another great piece in Nautilus http://nautil.us/issue/91/the-amazing-brain/our-mind_boggling-sense-of-smell  *** To get in touch with Ilan or join the conversation, you can find NOUS on Twitter @NSthepodcast or on email at nousthepodcast@gmail.com

Ann-Sophie Barwich on the Surprising Neuroscience of Smell

Despite multi-million dollar research programmes and impressive technical progress, neuroscience still can’t explain basic systems - like a maggot’s tiny brain or the grinding of a lobster’s stomach. Professor Matthew Cobb joins me to discuss the intellectual history of neuroscience,  his frank assessment of where we’re at, and how we can make progress. We cover: How the idea of the brain as computer got started in the mid-C20th, and why it’s probably wrong. (10:53) The challenge of the Grandmother Cell - and why some neurons selectively respond to Jennifer Aniston and Halle Berry! (21:00) What have we really learnt from fMRI? Is it “just a bit crap”? (27:25) Why the Human Brain Project was so controversial - and how its has spectacularly failed to live up to its own rhetoric (36:29). Could a neuroscientists understand a microprocessor? We discuss the brilliant study by Eric Jonas and Konrad Paul Kording. (41:30) The amazing achievement of artificial limbs (49:50) How useful is the ‘predictive brain theory’ favoured by Anil Seth, Karl Friston and Andy Clark? “Show me in a maggot!” Why we should get behind a Maggot Brain project. (58:40) Matthew’s book The Idea of the Brain has been shortlisted for the Baillie Gifford prize. Check it out here: https://bit.ly/2Ky6IOL *** To get in touch with Ilan or join the conversation, you can find NOUS on Twitter @NSthepodcast or on email at nousthepodcast@gmail.com

Matthew Cobb - Why Neuroscience Still Can’t Explain Much

Could depression be caused by inflammation?  Cambridge psychiatrist Ed Bullmore makes the case for his radical new theory, from his bestselling book The Inflamed Mind. Here's the breakdown... 6:12 There’s a Cartesian divide in the way we practice medicine.  Professor Bullmore argues that we need to find more integrated ways of treating body and mind. 8:52 The case of Mrs P who was suffering from arthritis and depression. But what was causing what? 12:31 Is this theory a biomedical or psychosocial approach to depression? Professor Bullmore argues that it can bridge the two. 18:07 There will never be just one theory for depression.  19:12 We chat through the enormous range of options on the DSM criterion for depression. Symptoms of depression can include losing weight and gaining weight, sleeping too much and sleeping too little.  21:50 Everyone has a 25% lifetime risk of depression - that’s 1 in every family. 23:11 Why depression may be a bit like fever: one symptom with myriad underlying causes, all of which need different treatments. 25:07 WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE? We finally get around to talking through the different sources of evidence for the Inflammatory theory of depression. Animal studies, longitudinal studies.  27:41 What is ‘inflammation’? 31:00 Can you have inflammation without having any apparent illness or injury? 35:40 Why you might want to try rubbing your auricles. Seriously, it’s nice. 38:47 Is it time to ditch the serotonin theory of depression once and for all? 44:22 Why did the big pharmaceutical companies start abandoning research into psychiatric drugs from 2010? 51:20 New research into the depression-inflammation link is now underway: what’s going on and what are we hoping to find? 54:52 Professor Bullmore shares his aspiration for the next 10 years: to integrate mental and physical healthcare in the way medical are trained and in the way they practice. The Inflamed Mind at Amazon Get in touch with Ilan or join the conversation! You can find NOUS on Twitter @NSthepodcast or on email at nousthepodcast@gmail.com

Edward Bullmore on the ‘inflamed mind’ theory of depression

‘Qualia’, the subjective qualities of experience, are the bedrock of some theories of consciousness - but they are a fiction according to my guest in this episode. With great charm and passion, Keith Frankish makes the case for ‘illusionism’. 0:54 We kick off chatting about Keith’s humorous definition of a philosopher as ‘an expert in everything and nothing.’ That leads us to Wilfrid Sellar’s famous description of the aim of philosophy: “to understand how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term.” 4:36 Keith argues that the strong concept of ‘emergence’ isn’t very helpful when thinking about complex systems like brains. It’s a reasonable assumption that the brain works just as predictably as computers, which we can build and control. 7:26 “I want to eliminate them” says Keith of phenomenal properties. And we’re off….! Keith introduces ‘qualia’ aka ‘phenomenal properties’. He avoids trotting out the usual account and first talks through some things we can all agree on. Qualia are the ‘something else’ that is supposedly happening while all the functional stuff is going on - they are supposed to be the subjective experience occurring alongside or in addition to cognition and behaviour. 11:30 I try to offer a concise definition of phenomenal properties, and Keith explains why he deliberately doesn’t like to start that way around: if you start with the common definition of qualia, you’ve already loaded the dice in favour of consciousness being a mystery! “You get captured by Cartesian gravity.” 17: 29 By defining phenomenal properties in the traditional way we “create an artefact that’s inexplicable - and then claim there’s a big mystery!” 22:50 Keith talks me through Dennett’s famous paper ‘Quining Qualia’, where he identifies 4 properties generally ascribed to qualia, and then goes on to show that there can’t possibly be such things! The four properties are: Private - They can only be known by you. Ineffable - You can’t really describe them, you can only note similarities and differences. Immediately or directly apprehensible - you know them with absolute certainty Intrinsic - they don’t represent anything external, they are part of the intrinsic nature of experience. 27:08 Keith makes an often neglected point: we generally describe our experiences as being properties of the world, not merely properties of our experience of the world. So the yellowness of a banana is not merely a feature of our experience, but of the banana! 28:08 What was ‘Galileo’s Error’? It’s the title of Philip Goff’s recent book which sets out his argument for panpsychism. Keith argues Galileo made a second, more significant error than the one Philip picks on: he plucks phenomenal properties out of the world and and places them in our minds. 29:50 We’ve been sidling up to it, now we tackle Keith’s ILLUSIONISM head on. Keith introduces the positive element of illusionism: the project of explaining why this way of thinking is so compelling. Possibly, Keith suggests, because it’s useful, maybe even adaptive.    He suggests that ‘phenomenal properties’ are really just packages full of the meanings of things, of the ways we respond to and interact with the world. Packaging them up in like this is a useful way of compressing the complexity of experience into discrete bundles. But the packages are just a useful cognitive trick - they aren’t mysterious metaphysical objects in themselves! 36:48 How does all of this this relate to the famous thought experiment about Mary the Neuroscientist? 41:17 Illusionism is a bit like watching a movie. What you’re actually seeing is a series of still images, but your visual system (mis)represents them as movement. Phenomenal properties are like the movement - they’re not really there, we just represent things as if they were. 43:00  All this talk of ‘representation’ leads me to wonder how much illusionism overlaps with the Higher Order Theory of consciousness, which was defended by the Joseph LeDoux in the last episode. Keith explain HOTs and how they are very similar in structure to his own theory, with one crucial difference.   48:30 Does illusionism suggest that we could create androids that think they’re consciousness in exactly the same way as we do?  51:40 What about the most common objection: how could is possibly be wrong about the nature of my own experience! If I’m feeling something, you can’t tell me I’m wrong about that. Keith responds that experience is the result of lots of lower level processes which get represented as being a certain way at higher levels; so you can be wrong.  54:40 THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: You’re going to have a painful operation and you have the choice of two anaesthetics: one of them will shut off the qualia, so you will have no phenomenal experience of pain BUT you will show all the behavioural manifestations of pain - screaming, writhing, crying.  The other anaesthetic does the opposite, it quells all the physical and behavioural responses to pain, but the qualia will be unaffected, so you continue to have some feeling of pain.  Which would you choose?  58:08 Where does the research programme of illusionism go next? 1:03:15 We finish with a short discussion of Keith’s work on ‘dual process’ theory. This was made famous by Daniel Kahneman - the idea there’s a slow, deliberate ‘System 2’ for careful, rational thought and a rule-of-thumb ‘System 1’  for fast, intuitive responses. Keith looked at how we similarly apply folk psychology to very deliberate, conscious behaviour and also to fairly automatic, habitual behaviour.  The End P.S. A few days after we recorded the interview, Keith posted this illusionist re-wording of Imagine on Twitter. I love it: Imagine there're no qualia It's easy if you try No feel or what-its-likeness Just plain old cog sci Imagine all the zombies Being just like us You may say I'm a quiner But there's nothing wrong with that I hope someday you'll join us And learn what it's like to be a bat *** Links Keith’s article on illusionism for Aeon magazine: https://aeon.co/essays/what-if-your-consciousness-is-an-illusion-created-by-your-brain Keith’s Twitter https://twitter.com/keithfrankish Keith’s Dyspectic Definitions: https://www.keithfrankish.com/dyspeptic-definitions/ We also touch on Philip Goff’s book Galileo’s Error and  Nicholas Humphrey’s book Soul Dust. Follow the podcast on Twitter https://twitter.com/NSthepodcast Visit the website http://nousthepodcast.libsyn.com/ Ilan Goodman   

Keith Frankish Exposes the Illusion of Consciousness

Patricia Churchland is the queen of neurophilosophy. She’s on fine form in this interview - charming, funny and occasionally savage as we range over her views on the nature of philosophy, the neuroscience and evolution of morality, and consider what’s wrong with the two major ethical traditions in western thought: utilitarianism and Kantianism.  1.43 - Is philosophy just a kind of science in its infancy - a ‘proto-science’ - or it is a special kind of conceptual analysis? Professor Churchland doesn’t pull her punches as she takes on the ‘language police’ approach to philosophy. 8.03 Why so much philosophy is useless. “They make finer and finer distinctions, which nobody in the sciences gives a tinker’s damn about!” 9.03 How epistemology is just ‘isms up the ying yang’! 10.40 What good work is being done in philosophy, and what makes it good? Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Owen Flanagan and Julian Savulescu get nods of approval. 12.00 We set to work discussing Professor Churchland’s book Conscience. Where does moral motivation come from in humans and other mammals? 16.20 Why was the evolution of warm-bloodedness important in this story? 18:00 The emergence of the cortex in mammals. Why the most sophisticated animals are the most helpless when they are born, and why it enables the most powerful learning.  20:40 Why the mammalian dependence on a caregiver is the origin of moral concern. 23.20 What precursors to moral behaviour do we see in chimpanzees, wolves and rodents? 28.40 What’s the difference between chimps and humans? It’s just more neurons! But, argues Prof Churchland, quantitative changes can beget qualitative differences in cognition and behaviour, as illustrated by advances in AI. 33.00 The Purveyors Of Pure Reason - what’s wrong with utilitarianism - and why is the contemporary Effective Altruist movement ‘a bit of an abomination’? Prof Churchland takes exception to the idea that 10 homeless folk should matter to her more than her own daughter, and defends the importance of community as a valid source of moral motivation. She explains why Russian philosophers called utilitarianism ‘Lenin’s Math.’ 44.00 How can neuroscience and evolution theory tell us anything important about ethics? Prof Churchland tackles the naturalistic fallacy, and argues that the sciences can usefully constrain our theorising. She celebrates the contributions of Hume and Aristotle. 47.32 Why morality is a lot harder than most moral philosophers think: it’s not just about figuring out some simple over-arching principles. Moral issues are really practical problems, not primarily exercises in rational reflection.    54.25 There are no moral authorities - but that shouldn’t cause us existential angst. We should be like the Buddhists and Confucians. TL:DR - Aristotle and Hume had it right: there are no moral authorities and no grand rules to live by. You gotta figure it out as you go along.  Follow NOUS on Twitter @NSthepodcast

Patricia Churchland on How We Evolved A Conscience

Do men and women have different brains? Jordan Peterson and the Google memo guy are pretty sure they do. Different chromosomes, different hormones = different brains. Right? Professor Gina Rippon disagrees. Biology, she argues, is not destiny and evidence of differences has been drastically overstated. For her efforts she has been called a ‘science denier’ & her ideas dismissed as politically correct nonsense. But in her book, The Gendered Brain, I found a careful assessment of evidence, and a powerful case for the immense plasticity of the brain in response to the social environment. Who’s right? Listen to the episode to hear Gina make her case and respond to her critics. 8.55 Men Are Map Readers Professor Rippon tackles the widely held belief that men are better at map reading and spatial navigation. How big are the differences that we find and how should we explain them? 13:50 At Last: The Truth! How the media report studies which find brain differences between men and women, and how they oftenn reinforce a belief in ‘gender essentialism’. 18:32 I try to pin Gina down - do any brain differences between men and women survive her methodological critiques? And how might brain differences translate into differences in behaviour? 21:45 Are Bigger Brains Better? I put to Prof Rippon the reported correlation between brain size and IQ. She surprises me by doubting the usefulness of IQ tests. We discuss the challenges of relating brain structure to function, and how correcting for size all but wipes out many of the reported differences. 30:05 It’s The Hormones, Right? The popular ‘Brain Organisation theory’, advocated by Simon Baron Cohen among others, holds that brain differences first emerge from the effect of hormones on the developing foetus. Prof Rippon argues that it oversimplifies the story.  39:16 Facing her Critics Prof Rippon’s ideas have been criticised by several other high profile neuroscientists including a previous guest on NOUS Kevin Mitchell, Stuart Ritchie. Her ideas were also attacked in Quillette. Prof Rippon responds - she IS NOT A SEX DIFFERENCE DENIER!  46:09 How to do Better Sex-Difference Research Prof Rippon argues for including variables like years in education, occupation and socioeconomic status in research design - because they also impact the brain and have differentially gendered effects. 48:07 Evolution of sex differences - Surely evolution has made men and women different? Prof Rippon throws shade on evolutionary psychology. 51:16 Why are some people transgender? If there is no male brain and female brain, why do some people feel that they are a man in a woman’s body or vice versa?  Prof Rippon advocates for ‘gender irrelevance’.  57:58 The Gender Equality Paradox - Scandinavian countries- were gender equality is highest - have the greatest gender gaps in typically male or female professions. Why? Buy Gina's book here: https://amzn.to/2O5E1Gx  Follow us on Twitter @NSthepodcast Thanks to the STS department at UCL, where this episode was recorded. Check out their full range of undergraduate and postgraduate courses here: www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/

Gina Rippon on the Myth of the Gendered Brain

This episode features a neurologist with some striking tales to tell about who we become when our brains start to break. What happens when memories are gradually destroyed by Alzheimer's, when our personality is drastically transformed by dementia, or when a sudden surge of creativity is unleashed by Parkinson’s medication? Dr Jules Montague’s new book Lost and Found integrates moving stories of her own patients with philosophical ideas about personal identity. The result is a fascinating insight into the fragile and complex workings of the brain, and a profound and compassionate reflection on the relationship between memory, personality and identity. 6:26 What does memory loss in Alzheimer’s disease mean for identity? 13:32 Why the notion of ‘embodiment’ offers a richer understanding of identity 16:10 The Extended Mind theory - how phones and pens are part of our cognitive apparatus. 18:23  How our selves are created jointly, through relationships 23:09 The dynamic and unstable nature of memory 27:34 Why personality can be radically transformed by dementia 33:26 How dopamine medication can cause a surge of creativity 42:49 Tools of the neurologists’ trades: how simple questions and reflex hammers can reveal brain damage Jules' book Lost and Found is now available in paperback, check it out here.  Thanks to the STS department at UCL, where this episode was recorded. Check out their full range of undergraduate and postgraduate courses here: www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/ Follow us on Twitter @NSthepodcast

Jules Montague on Dementia, Memory and Identity

My guest in this episode is a neurogeneticist who is unafraid to tackle some of the most politically charged questions in science. Dr Kevin Mitchell is an associate professor at the Institute of Neuroscience at Trinity College Dublin. His recent book INNATE sets out to show ‘How The Wiring of Our Brains Shapes Who We Are’, and in it he offers his take on the latest research into the biological underpinnings of intelligence, gender, sexuality, and psychiatric disorders. We start off discussing the complexities of figuring out how genes link to psychological traits and how random ‘noise’ in the process of development may be crucial. 14:54 What’s the best metaphor for describing how genes work? Should we think of them as a blueprint, a program, a recipe or even a database? 21:52 I probe Kevin for his explanation of the Mystery of Missing Heritability. Why has molecular genetics not been more successful? 30:39 We tackle the brain differences between men and women, and explore the biological basis of homosexuality. Did you know we can deliberately breed homosexual rats? 45:44 We discuss Kevin’s view that psychiatric conditions are genetic and that genetics can transform the field. 58:11 Kevin leaves me with a brief, provocative outline of his view that we can have free will despite being in some sense biologically determined creatures. Check out Kevin's book Innate: How The Wiring of Our Brains Makes Us Who We Are and also his blog Wiring the Brain. Follow us on Twitter @NSthepodcast  

Kevin Mitchell on How The Wiring of Our Brains Shapes Who We Are

My guest in this episode could be described as a medical doctor who thinks we transcend our biology, or as a neuroscientist who thinks there is much more to us than our brains. Raymond Tallis spent many years as an NHS consultant and Professor of Geriatric Medicine, specialising in the neuroscience of strokes and epilepsy. He is also a prolific thinker, having published more than 20 substantial works of philosophy. Core to his outlook is the claim the human consciousness is utterly unique in ways that can’t be reduced to brains and biology. Unlike other animals we have a shared sense of the world enabling complex collaboration and meaning-creation and we have a rich sense of the past and the future. For Ray, neither of these features can be explained by looking at brains. Our discussion also covers why Ray thinks we have free will, why Benjamin Libet’s famous experiments are naive and misguided and why a future genius is needed to unravel the profound mysteries of the human mind.... Links: Raymond Tallis' personal site Ray's books mentioned in this episode: In Defence of Wonder  Aping Mankind The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being  Why The Mind Is Not a Computer Logos: The Mystery of How We Make Sense of the World Follow us on Twitter @NSthepodcast 

Raymond Tallis on the Uniqueness of Human Consciousness

In this episode I meet a controversial clinical psychologist who thinks that mainstream mental health services are bad for us. Dr Lucy Johnstone has worked for many years on the frontline of adult mental health services - helping those who may have been diagnosed with conditions like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or clinical depression. It's a staggering fact that roughly a quarter of British adults have been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder at some point in their lives. But Dr Johnstone thinks that these diagnoses are totally wrong - invalid and unhelpful.  Giving someone a psychiatric diagnosis, she argues, is the first step drawing them into a system which treats them as if their problems are symptoms of a physical illness. But that, she argues, is wrong. I interviewed Dr Johnstone at her home in Bristol, where we discussed her wide-ranging critique of psychiatry & her new initiative - the Power Threat Meaning Framework - the basis for a radically different approach to mental health which abandons diagnosis altogether and promises to treat individuals as  ‘people with problems, rather than patients with illnesses’. She has said it’s the culmination of her life’s work. Explore the Power Threat Meaning Framework here See Lucy's latest book A Straight Talking Introduction to Psychiatric Diagnosis, and also Users and Abusers of Psychiatry.  Also mentioned in the interview:  Joanna Moncrieff's book The Myth of the Chemical Cure Robert Whitaker's book Anatomy of an Epidemic   Follow us @NSthepodcast   

Lucy Johnstone Against Psychiatric Diagnosis

Panpsychism can seem like a bonkers theory of consciousness, but according to Philip Goff and a growing chorus of leading thinkers - from philosophers to neuroscientists - it might just be right… In this episode we discuss why Philip rates panpsychism as 'the worst solution to the problem of consciousness - apart from all the others.' We explore his dramatic claim that Bertrand Russell and Arthur Eddington did for consciousness science what Darwin did for the science of life, how 'Galileo's Error' made it impossible for science to ever fully explain the experience of seeing a rose, and why the taste of Marmite can never be satisfactorily explained by neuroscience. We also cover why physics can never tell us about the intrinsic nature of stuff - just how it behaves. And Philip shares his proudest moment in philosophy - when he persuaded Daniel Dennett he was wrong...  Links Philip's book Galileo's Error: A New Science of Consciousness is available to order now, but will be released in August 2019, published by Rider in the UK, Pantheon in the US.  Find Philip on twitter @philip_goff. Check out his personal website including links to his academic publications here: www.philipgoffphilosophy.com And his blog for a general audience: www.conscienceandconsciousness   Follow us on Twitter @NSthepodcast    

Philip Goff on why consciousness may be fundamental to reality

NOUS tackles the deepest questions about the mind, through conversations with leading thinkers working in philosophy, neuroscience, psychiatry and beyond. Each episode features an in-depth conversation focussing on one big idea. How does the brain produce consciousness? Are mental illnesses just biological? Are there limits to the power of neuroscience - or will it eventually unravel the mysteries of free will and morality? Hosted by Ilan Goodman

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Joseph LeDoux on the 4 Billion Year Journey to Our Conscious...

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